KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 thereby generate "a bird's eye view that reveals the whole-the big picture; how the parts fit together." 5 Part I of this essay will provide a brief guide to the various branches of biolaw. Part II offers some thoughts on the intellectual significance of treating biolaw as a scientifically coherent enterprise.
I. BIOLAW: A JURISONOMY
Linnaean taxonomy classifies the members of the biosphere according to a hierarchical set of categories: kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, species (readily committed to mnemonics such as "kings play chess on fancy glass stools"). Like its biological counterpart, biolaw lends itself to a systematic form of classification-a jurisonomy, if you will, by analogy to the better established neologism, folksonomy (folk + taxonomy).
Five basic dichotomies distinguish the various branches of biolaw: legal analysis of biology versus biological analysis of law, ecolaw versus anthropolaw (οίκος versus άνθρωπος), conservation versus exploitation, greens versus browns, and conventional versus transgenic biotechnology.

A. Legal Analysis of Biology Versus Biological Analysis of Law
This is perhaps the most fundamental divide of all. Entire bodies of law are devoted to biological subject matter. Health law, environmental law, and food and drug law are perhaps the largest categories. Agricultural law and the law of natural resources (especially forestry and fisheries) remind us that the law pays special attention to extraction industries. Bioethics and biotechnology law patrol the frontiers where human ingenuity collides with boundaries set by natural genomes and social mores. All of these areas derive their intellectual coherence, and their legitimacy, from the law itself. The United States Code, after all, includes the National Environmental Policy Act, as enacted January 1, 1970, 6 and as subsequently amended. The vast majority of biolaw's practitioners devote themselves to some variation or another on this theme. "Legal analysis of biology" accounts for most of the intellectual biomass in biolaw. The social triumph of this branch of the discipline can be measured with a solitary but singularly impressive statistic: the first seventy-eight years of 5. DAVID GELERNTER, MIRROR WORLDS OR THE DAY SOFTWARE PUTS THE UNIVERSE IN A SHOEBOX . . . HOW IT WILL HAPPEN AND WHAT IT WILL MEAN 52 (1991) (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 52-53 (describing topsight as "the quality that distinguishes genius in any field" and "the most precious intellectual commodity known to man" (emphasis omitted)).
6. Pub. L. No. 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § § 4321-4370d (2000)).
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systematic food and drug regulation in the United States coincided with a shocking increase of twenty-six years in life expectancy, an actuarial leap forward unprecedented in human history and, at least in the developed world, unlikely to be duplicated. 7 But a growing body of legal scholarship subjects problems from all aspects of law to analysis that is either explicitly biological or at least strongly influenced by the life sciences. Entire careers in law teaching now hinge on the application of neuroscience, behavioral psychology, and evolutionary biology to subjects as varied as family law, criminal law, and torts. 8 To the extent that "behavioral economics" is merely a left-of-center label for "evolutionary biology" or even "sociobiology," a field whose faint (and fallacious) association with social Darwinism is anathema to the legal academy's dominant culture, "biological analysis of law" arguably embraces the entire post-Chicago law and economics movement. For instance, the entire roster of shortcomings in environmental protection and risk regulation, 9 especially mistakes in judgment traceable to the overvaluation of salient evidence, 10 has a biological basis. If this broad definition takes hold, biological analysis of law might already command a greater intellectual profile than its more practice-oriented subdisciplines among established areas of law devoted to regulating living things and the life sciences.
B. Ecolaw Versus Anthropolaw
An essay designed to explain a neologism might be well advised to avoid stacking further neologisms. But the difference between the ancient Greek words οίκος (meaning house) and άνθρωπος (meaning human being) facilitates a convenient and useful way of distinguishing between branches of biolaw. οίκος supplies the English root eco-, which Ernst Haeckel (using the German analogue öko-) used to coin the term ecology. 11 Άνθρωπος, for its part, is the origin of words such as anthropology, misanthrope, and anthropocentric. Although the difference is often one of perspective rather than substance, ecological and anthropocentric approaches to biolaw seem to rest on divergent, and sometimes even contradictory, ethical premises. For this reason alone, the distinction is worth observing.
Consider the problem of regulating airborne lead. 12 From ecolaw's point of view, removing lead-based additives from gasoline is a straightforward application of the Clean Air Act, one of the broadest environmental statutes designed to guarantee the integrity of a basic medium, the terrestrial atmosphere. By contrast, anthropolaw would regard the problem of leaded gasoline as one of public health and perhaps also of social justice (insofar as the most vulnerable victims of lead poisoning tend to be young, poor, and nonwhite). Few, if any, practitioners or scholars of environmental law would view the problem as strictly one of environmental protection, or strictly one of public health. Nevertheless, drawing the distinction forces us to decide, at least as a matter of initial ethical principles, whether human health or a less anthropocentric notion of "deep green" is paramount.
Indeed, on some occasions-for instance, the introduction of the Nile perch (Lates niloticus) into Lake Victoria 13 -οίκος and άνθρωπος favor radically different outcomes. The ecological loss of biological diversity in "Darwin's Dreampond," estimated as the extinction of several hundred endemic cichlids, is simply incommensurable.
By contrast, an anthropocentric analysis would give at least some weight to the economic value of Lake Victoria's Nile perch fishery and of sport fishing tourism to the lake. 
D. Greens Versus Browns
Environmental law again illustrates another difference in perspectives within biolaw. Are biological problems demanding legal solutions more fruitfully analyzed from a "brown" pollution-control paradigm, or from a "green" perspective stressing the removal or (better yet) prevention of a perceptible human footprint on the biosphere? Entire bodies of law fall on one side or the other of this divide. Pollution control feels very different from endangered species protection, and for that reason a "green" law school course on natural resources law (as distinct from a broader survey course on environmental law) more readily accommodates a segment on the Endangered Species Act than one on the Clean Water Act.
Again, though, this dichotomy cuts more subtly within subdisciplines connecting law with the life sciences. Consider one of the most ambitious legal applications of conservation biology: the hope that environmental law might facilitate the restoration of ecosystems compromised by human activity. 20 Ecosystem restoration is typically defined as "the return of an ecosystem to a close approximation of its condition prior to disturbance." 21 More aggressive definitions of restoration as "the process of repairing damage caused by humans to the diversity and dynamics of indigenous ecosystems" lay explicit blame at human feet. 22 By contrast, in a creative twist on a challenge conventionally regarded as a "green" problem of minimizing human footprints, Alyson Flournoy approaches ecosystem restoration as if it were a medical project. She describes ecosystems as "sick," thanks to numerous pathologies attributable to human activity. 23 From this perspective, environmental policymakers should seek to diagnose the illness and to prescribe an appropriate cure as if impaired ecosystems were human patients. I hasten to add that different approaches to conservation biology have made little or no legal difference. Federal courts routinely decline to treat conservation biology as "a necessary element of diversity analysis" under federal forest management statutes. 24 For instance, the Seventh Circuit has held that uncertainties surrounding the application of "population dynamics, species turnover, patch size, recolonization problems, fragmentation problems, edge effects, and island biogeography" permitted the U.S. Forest Service to ignore these principles of conservation biology.
25
Even a valid "general theory," that court held, "does not translate into a management tool unless one can apply it to a concrete situation." 26 Similarly, a federal district court has declined to require the Fish and Wildlife Service to adopt specific techniques for managing "distinct geographic ecosystems . . . inhabited by grizzly bears." 27 The court reasoned that science or circumstances might change and thereby undermine the claim that the Endangered Species Act requires the Fish and Wildlife Service to establish linkage zones between ecosystems inhabited by grizzlies.
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E. Conventional Versus Transgenic Biotechnology
Finally, within specific areas of biolaw that deal with the development, ownership, and deployment of biological technology, a sharp distinction separates conventional technology from transgenic techniques. Although humans have modified the genetic destiny of other organisms since the dawn of agriculture and animal husbandry, the ability to manipulate genes without regard to "natural" reproduction has raised an extremely large set of legal issues.
Biotechnology 49 helped shift the spotlight. As a general rule, the American law of intellectual property defers all questions of consumer safety, environmental protection, and morality to other legal schemes.
50
Perhaps the most succinct way of summarizing this distinction lies in vocabulary.
Conventional biotechnology-biological concepts and breeding techniques associated with Charles Darwin, Gregor Mendel, Luther Burbank, and Norman Borlaug-speaks in the Greco-Latin terms associated with the Linnaean taxonomy of living things. Transgenic techniques, by contrast, are described with vaguely corporate and definitely threatening acronyms such as GMO (genetically modified organism) and rbST (recombinant bovine somatotropin). From PCR (polymerase chain reaction) to RNAi (ribonucleic acid interference), "new" biotechnology poses a linguistically and emotionally daunting challenge to the law. By contrast, even the name Yersinia pestis-the bacterium responsible for bubonic plague 51 -sounds downright romantic. Having defined biolaw, I will now explain why it matters.
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II. BIOLAW AS A MEDIATOR AMONG THREE INTELLECTUAL CULTURES
The challenge of defining biolaw represents one small facet of a social problem that has long bedeviled science and the broader culture. Biolaw straddles the crucial, hotly contested point where the distinct and often antagonistic cultures of literature and the arts, the natural sciences, and the social sciences collide. In his celebrated lecture, The Two Cultures, C.P. Snow excoriated the conflict between what he called the scientific and literary cultures. Snow aimed his sharpest criticism for "natural Luddites," the "[W]estern intellectuals [who] have never tried, wanted, or been able to understand the industrial revolution, much less accept it." 52 The dominant literary culture's refusal to embrace science and its industrial applications, said Snow, condemned humanity's humblest to a wretched, short existence: 53 Most of our fellow human beings . . . are underfed and die before their time. In the crudest terms, that is the social condition. There is a moral trap which comes through the insight into man's loneliness: it tempts one to sit back, complacent in one's unique tragedy, and let the others go without a meal. 54 In a world "where cultural antipathies are very much alive and kicking," The Two Cultures still resonates. 55 Deep, even catastrophic, cultural divides cripple public understanding of a wide range of scientifically sophisticated issues, from global climate change and biodiversity loss to childhood vaccination, embryonic stem cell research, contraception, abortion, and end-of-life decisionmaking.
Crudely stated, biolaw's mission is that of bridging the scientific and literary cultures that Snow found so lamentably divided in 1959. By virtue of their training, scientifically literate lawyers and legal scholars owe a special duty to ply the intellectual tools unique to what Snow perceived vaguely as something like "a third culture," a community of social scientists "concerned with how human beings are living or have lived."
56 Anyone who would live contemporary life in its immense fullness and complexity must master not only the scientific culture's "basic facts" and "guiding 52. C.P. SNOW, THE TWO CULTURES: AND A SECOND LOOK 22 (2d ed. 1965). 53. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (Richard Tuck ed., 1996) (describing life as "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short").
54. SNOW, supra note 52, at 6-7. Ever since it became impossible to speak of law without appending the conjunction and, 58 or at least since legal scholars stopped thinking of law as an autonomous discipline, 59 law has stood at the center of the "third culture" of the social sciences. At their best, social sciences such as law, economics, and positive political theory bridge the scientific and literary cultures, much as Snow himself, as a scientist, novelist, and public administrator, traversed all three of contemporary civilization's intellectual subcultures.
The law's access to the literary culture enables biolaw to achieve social goals, especially by political means, that natural scientists often find frustratingly beyond their reach. Law represents nothing more and nothing less than "'the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.'" 60 That project, no less than any exercise in economic problemsolving, "must ultimately dissolve into a study of aesthetics and morals."
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This very source of strength, however, represents the law's deepest intellectual weakness. Legally trained professionals face formidable barriers to escaping the deepest intellectual traps of the literary culture. Perhaps the starkest contrast between the scientific and literary cultures of C.P. Snow's celebrated lecture appears in these two cultures' regard for the past. Whereas a "science which hesitates to forget its founders is lost," 62 the literary culture reserves its highest regard for "giants in the earth" in days "of old," in days "of renown." 63 The literary culture reveres founders; the scientific culture fosters forgetters. To the extent that the law yearns for ancient, even legendary, inspiration, it favors the literary culture in the war of values that Snow decried.
Worse still, the law shares other literary disciplines' instinctive response to the natural world's frightening "scarcity of rhyme and reason" The resulting "illusion of predictability and even of mastery" gives rise to the fantasy "we can manipulate the world around us by appealing to the imaginary forces we have invented."
65 As a result, lawyers as a class seem as prone to the fundamental fallacy of creationism-the mirage of anthropomorphic agency-as the layperson or (worse still) the elected official who rejects the central historic narrative of evolutionary biology: life on this ancient earth of ours is shaped by forces no more mysterious than random mutation, natural and sexual selection, adaptive radiation, evolutionary convergence, and the occasional meteor strike.
Among leading "caricatures" that well-intentioned observers use to describe nature and other complex systems, the predominant view of law is that of a complex system "existing at or near an equilibrium condition." 66 Conventional depictions of the law treat time neither as "a gulf to be bridged" nor as "a yawning abyss," but rather as a medium "filled with the continuity of custom and tradition, in the light of which all that is handed down presents itself to us." 67 Colloquial uses of "law" in other fields, such as Grimm's law, 68 the third law of thermodynamics, or Zipf's law, 69 all treat "laws" as immanent, enduring principles that govern natural phenomena. These descriptions of law-in its literal sense as a system of governance and in the figurative sense suggested by the language of science-obscure the role of sudden, even catastrophic change in legal evolution. "In biological terms, stasis is death; only growth and change keep the organism alive." 70 To ensure that its "ideas and aspirations . . . survive more ages than one," the law must respond to upheaval.
Judicially and politically negotiated equilibria in law 72 are episodic at best and prone to violent interruption. 73 The so-called jurisdynamics of human governance 74 reflects a sort of "punctuated equilibrium," reminiscent of Stephen Jay Gould's description of biological evolution. 75 Even within the scientific culture, disciplinary divides persist. Scientists are trying to bridge the "curious lack of communication between molecular biologists and the mathematicians and electrical engineers who developed information theory and coding theory." 76 Treating biology as a branch of information science naturally and effectively connects those disciplines. Code, whether it is expressed in binary digits or in the ATCG alphabet of molecular biology, 77 is code. 78 Having long "conceive[d] of genetic information and electronic information as information," we now "have the technical capability to make good on this conception." 79 Gerald Edelman won the 1972 Nobel Prize in medicine for discovering how antibodies enabled the immune system to identify and remember patterns and thereby to attack invaders without harming itself. 80 Seemingly simple organisms, real or virtual, have solved mazes and performed other complex pathfinding tasks.
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Bioinformatics represents merely one tendril of the scientific rhizome that has grown from the double helix.
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Computer scientists have experimented with DNA itself as a parallel processor.
83
Professional taxonomy-the time-honored task of classifying all living things-is being transformed by an electronically driven revolution that harnesses the storage and search capacities of the Internet. 84 The online Encyclopedia of Life intends "to document all species of life on Earth" by maintaining a "constantly evolving encyclopedia that lives on the Internet, with contributions from scientists and amateurs alike." 85 At any level-evolutionary, ecological, organismal, physiological, cellular, or molecular 86 -biology is displaying the "emergent behavior" of "complex adaptive systems." 
